Sunday, September 20, 2015

THE HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE


APPENDIX VI

THE HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE
Statement made by M. Van Rees, Vice-Chairman
of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in
Geneva, June 5, 1930
M. VAN REES thought it useless to draw conclusions
from this, since they were obvious .
M. Van Rees, continuing, wished to examine
the complaints of the Jews . No chapter of the
Commission of Enquiry's report was devoted to
the legal side of the position of the Jews in Palestine.
Only a passing reference was made to that
situation, and there was no effort to explain the
grounds on which the Jews inhabited Palestine
nor up to what point their demands must be regarded
as legitimate.
Since any serious examination of the rights of
the Jews to live and carry on their activity in
Palestine was not to be found in the report, it
was difficult not to draw the conclusion that this
point of capital importance had not received in
the report the attention which it deserved.
:4:
22I
222 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
The Commission did not state that the Balfour
Declaration was the basis of the presence
of the Jews in Palestine and of their activities .
The Commission of Enquiry did not explain its
views on the close connection between that Declaration
and certain provisions in the Palestine
mandate. It had confined itself to quoting them,
but had refrained from giving any interpretation.
It had ended by recommending the British
Government to explain more explicitly than had
been the case in 1922 its policy with regard to
the Jews . The most striking fact was that, although
the report referred in many places to the
official statements contained in the White Paper
of June, 1922, the Commission seemed to have
attached no importance to the basis of those
statements which it did not even quote . Yet that
basis was that "the Jewish people will be in Palestine
as of right and not on sufferance" (see White
Paper, page 30) .
Nevertheless, it was this statement of Mr .
Churchill's which, by explaining the legal reasons
for the establishment of the Jews in the
country, furnished the key to that which was
not clear in the report of the Commission.
The Balfour Declaration of November 2nd,
1917, as recorded in the Preamble and developed
APPENDIX VI
223
in Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and i i of the Palestine Mandate,
had a very definite meaning .
It was not, as several persons had seen fit to
interpret it, a mere gracious gesture, a mere public
manifestation of indulgent pity toward the
Jewish people. It would be altogether too naive
to believe that this had been the only feeling inspiring
Great Britain in her Declaration of November
2rid, 11917. It would be also equally naive
to believe that that declaration had been approved
by all the Great Powers merely in order
to please Great Britain or in order to show their
sympathy for the Jews .
Interpreted in its own words and with the aid
of the text of the mandate based upon it, the
Balfour Declaration would be seen to be an act
based on purely political considerations and designed
to secure an eminently practical object .
That object had certainly not been the oppression
of a people established in the country by
another people, as the adversaries of the Declaration
wished it to be believed, despite the reservations
contained in the Declaration . On the
contrary, its object was the resurrection of the
people established in Palestine . Its object was to
arouse them from their centuries-old lethargy
and to secure the social and economic development
of the country, not by the efforts of the
224 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
Administration alone, but by the active co-operation
of a more energetic and more highly developed
people . In short, the real object of the
Balfour Declaration had been the establishment,
by the co-activity of the Government and of
the Jewish people, of a social and economic order
corresponding to the principles and requirements
of European civilisation, while at the same time
respecting the rights and interests of the existing
inhabitants .
It had been that reason, which, disregarding
the other considerations relating to the primary
interests of the Empire, had induced the Government
to agree, in order to fulfil the mission
which it had felt sure would be given to it at
the end of the war, to allow the Jewish people
to participate, not in the powers of administration
of Palestine, but in the practical execution
of that mission.
This conception appeared to be fully justified
by the facts. It explained the reason why Mr .
Churchill, as M. Van Rees had already pointed
out, had been able to state that the Jewish people
would be in Palestine "as of right" ; or in other
words, that that people would not enter the
country as foreigners, but would belong to the
Palestinian nation to be subsequently created . It
would further explain why Article 4 of the ManAPPENDIX
VI
225
date officially recognised the Jewish organisation
as the organisation representing the Jewish people
and chosen to co-operate with the Government.
It further explained why Articles 6 and
7 referred to the special privileges enjoyed by
Jews in respect of immigration, the acquisition
of Palestinian nationality and their establishment
on empty land, subject to reservations regarding
the rights and interests of other persons . Finally,
it explained why Article i i, of which the meaning
was just as significant, expressly enjoined the
participation of the Jews in the execution or exploitation
of public works and services as well as
in the development of the natural resources of
the country.
All these provisions were closely interconnected.
They formed a single whole and clearly
expressed the fundamental idea that to the work
of civilisation to be carried out in Palestine the
Jewish element would contribute its moral and
above all its material support, not in virtue of
holding any kind of concession of an economic
nature, but in virtue of its right to collaborate
with the Administration . In this the Jewish activity
formed an integral part of the economic
evolution of Palestine, of which the mandate
had been entrusted to the Mandatory Power and
226 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
'which was the primary condition of the political
development of the country.
M. Van Rees thought it regrettable that this
point had not been seriously considered by the
Commission of Enquiry. It was even more regrettable
that the special situation granted by the
mandate to the Jewish element in Palestine appeared
to have escaped the notice of the Administration
itself to such a degree that the three
statesmen whose names were specially connected
with the Declaration of November 2nd, 1917-
Lord Balf our, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Smuts
-had been led to state publicly that causes
"which are still obscure have impeded the task
of administration and consequently the full carrying
out of the policy" (letter published by
The Times, December zoth, 1929) .
It must be recognised that this was the, main
substance of the Jewish complaints . All the information
which the Commission possessed regarding
the manner in which the Mandate had
been applied showed that the three statesmen
whom he had just quoted had not been mistaken .
On the contrary, the fact was that, generally
speaking, the clauses of the Mandate concerning
the Jews had not, in practice, received that application
which their authors might have expected
; not, in the first place, owing to the volAPPENDIX
VI
227
untary opposition of the Administration, but in
consequence, M. Van Rees thought, at any rate
in part, of the misunderstanding of the special
situation which the international obligations assumed
by Great Britain had granted to Jewish
people in Palestine.
At this stage, M . Van Rees would enquire
whether the British Government substantially
adopted the statement of the Shaw Commission
to the effect that no premeditation and no organised
revolt had occurred, for this point was
not clearly stated in the British Government's
memorandum.
Dr. Drummond Shiels replied in the affirmative.
The views of the British Government on this
point were contained in that document .
M. Van Rees said that in that case he wished
to explain his views on that part of the conclusions
of the Commission of Enquiry .
As far as the question of premeditation was
concerned, the Commission of Enquiry justified
its conclusions by observing (paragraph 2 of its
conclusions, page z58) that the disorders had
not occurred simultaneously in all parts of Palestine.
'What did this argument mean? Was it
necessary that a rebellion should simultaneously
spread to all the parts of a territory before it
could be concluded that it was premeditated?
228 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
The second argument on which the Commission
based its views did not appear more conclusive.
The day before the outbreak of the disorder
(see the report page 8o), the representatives
of Jews and Arabs had met in conference
to discuss the interests of Palestine . The exchange
of views had taken place "in a friendly
spirit." This was a fact to which the Commission
appeared to attach great importance, and it was
all the more surprising in that everyone knew
that Orientals, and among them the Arabs, in
particular, were some of the best diplomatists
in the world, and that they were very careful
not to show their real thoughts by adopting a
revealing attitude .
He felt it difficult, therefore, to understand
why the Commission of Enquiry had concluded
that there had been no premeditation and no organisation
in preparing for the disturbances, despite
a number of its observations to which he
thought it useful to draw attention .
"That the first of these motives is proved
there can be no question ; neither the Arab
Executive nor the Mufti has at any time endeavoured
to conceal the fact that the policy
which, since 1918, successive Governments of
His Majesty have followed in Palestine is reAPPENDIX
VI
229
garded by them as being detrimental to the
interests of those whom they represent . Their
opposition to that policy has been unwavering.
The Arab Executive, from its institution,
has opposed the policy and declined to accept
the White Paper of 1922 (Cmd. 1700) ; there
is no evidence that it has ever departed from
the attitude which it then adopted. The Mufti,
as a private person before his election to his
present office, gave such expression to his feeling
in the matter of policy in Palestine that
he was implicated in the disturbances of
1920." (Page 71)
"The movement which he in part created
became, through the force of circumstances,
a not unimportant factor in the events which
led to the outbreak of August last, and to that
extent he, like many others who directly or
indirectly played upon public feeling in Palestine,
must accept a share in the responsibility
for the disturbances." (Page 75)
"That in many districts there was incitement
and that in some cases those who incited
were members of the Moslem hierarchy are
facts which have been established to the satisfaction
of Courts in Palestine ; equally, it cannot
be questioned that agitators were touring
the country in the third week of August last
230 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
and were summoning the people of certain
districts to Jerusalem." (Page 75)
"Opposition to the Balfour Declaration is
an important element in the policy of the
Palestine Arab Executive and, as we have already
stated, it is our opinion that their feelings
on this political issue might have provided
a sufficient motive to have caused them to incite
or to organise disturbance ." (Page 78)
"We also accept the evidence that there was
a marked increase in Arab activity after August
5th, and as we have already stated, it
cannot be doubted that, during the third week
of August, agitators were touring the country."
(Page 79)
"His (Sulehi Bey al Khadra, member of the
Arab Executive) general demeanour before us
was such that we believe that he would welcome
any opportunity of furthering what he
regards as the just cause of Arab nationalism
in Palestine ." (Page 8o)
M. Van Rees wondered how the conclusions
that there had been neither premeditation nor
organisation could be reconciled with the reservations
and statements made by the Commission
on pages 15 8, 159 and 164 in paragraphs 6, 11,
12, 1 3 and 45 (c) .
APPENDIX VI
231
In its constant preoccupation only to accept
legal and formal proofs, the Commission had
reached a negative conclusion as soon as these
legal principles appeared to it to be inconclusive.
It seemed to have ignored the fact that, in
an Eastern country where feudal conditions of
life still existed, effective proof against the traditional
religious and other leaders of the people
would very rarely be found . The Commission
appeared not to have realised that, in those circumstances,
a passive attitude on the part of the
leaders was generally as significant in the case
of a population worked up by agitation and excited
by an appeal to their religious feelings as
active participation in the subsequent rising .
In his reference to the Commission of Enquiry,
M. Van Rees had spoken only of the majority.
The minority consisted of a single member,
Mr. Snell. In his report, that gentleman had
adopted a far more logical attitude than that
adopted by the majority. On page 172 he said
that the causes of the disturbances of August
"were due to fears and antipathies which, I am
convinced, the Moslem and Arab leaders awakened
and fostered for political needs ." With reference
to the Mufti, Mr . Snell said on the same
page:
232 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
"I have not the least doubt that he was
aware of the nature of that campaign and
that he realised the danger of disturbances
which is never absent when religious propaganda
of an exciting character is spread among
a Moslem people. I therefore attribute to the
Mufti a greater share in the responsibility for
the disturbance than is attributed to him in
the report. I am of opinion that the Mufti
must bear the blame for his failure to make
any effort to control the character of an agitation
conducted in the name of a religion of
which, in Palestine, he was the head ."
Mr. Snell went on to state :
"If the campaign of political agitation had
for its objective the removal of grievances and
the securing of safeguards for the future, the
methods of propaganda adopted by the Arab
leaders were, in my opinion, ill-chosen and
futile ; if, on the other hand, the campaign
was designed to arouse Arab and Moslem passion,
those who participated in it, knowing
full well the results of like agitation in the
past, cannot have been unaware of the possibility
that serious disturbance would follow .
Though I agree, that the Arab Executive is
not of necessity responsible as a body for the
APPENDIX VI 233
words or acts of its followers or even its individual
members, I find it difficult to believe
that the actions of individual members of the
Executive were unknown to that body, or indeed,
that those individuals were acting in a
purely personal capacity ."
Mr. Snell next pointed out: (page 173)
"Finally, in regard to the campaign of incitement,
I am unable to agree that the conclusions
in the report acquitting the Moslem
religious authorities of all but the slightest
blame for the innovations introduced in the
neighbourhood of the Wailing Wall . . . . It
is my view that many innovations which followed
thereafter, such as the construction of
the zawiyah, the calling to prayer by the
muezzin and the opening of the new doorway,
were dictated less by the needs of the
Moslem religion and the rights of property
than by the studied desire to provoke and
wound the religious susceptibilities of the Jewish
people."
Mr. Snell finally repeated, on page 18o, that
the feeling of hostility and animosity on the part
of the Arabs towards the Jews
" . . . . was rather the result of a campaign
234 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
of propaganda and incitement than the natural
consequence of economic factors ."
After a close study of all the elements of the
problem to which M. Van Rees had devoted considerable
time, he had not the least doubt that
the responsibility for what had happened must
lie with the religious and political leaders of the
Arabs. This profound conviction had caused M.
Van Rees to associate himself entirely with the
remarkably well expressed account of the matter
that had appeared in an article written by M .
William Martin, published in the Nouvelle Revue
Juive for the month of April, 1930 (page 22) .
The only result of that proclamation on the
Arabs had been that they had maintained that
the Jews were alone responsible for the sanguinary
disorders, as could be seen from page 68 of
the report of the Commission of Enquiry. In
making such an inconceivably foolish statement,
they did not realise that they were showing exactly
the same mentality as that displayed in
British India at the present time . Since Gandhi
had openly declared civil disobedience, disorders
had occurred which he pretended not to have
desired but which must inevitably have occurred .
Nevertheless, it was still true that, in the eyes
of his partisans and in his own eyes, the British
APPENDIX VI
2 35
Government must be held responsible for the
victims of the madness which he had let loose .
It was true, that in British India there were no
Jews to whom the responsibility for what had
happened could be attributed.
It was very difficult to believe that, in spite of
its own doubts, to which M. Van Rees had just
referred and despite the delicate manner in which
those doubts had been expressed, the Commission
had been able to conclude that there had
been no premeditation or organisation of the
disturbances on the part of the Arab leaders . It
was even more surprising that the Commission
should have extended this conclusion to cover
the Head of the Supreme Moslem Council, the
Grand Mufti Haj Amin El Husseini, referred
to in several quarters as one of the principal organisers
of these disturbances.
On page 71 of its report, the Commission
stated that the Mufti had been implicated in the
troubles which had occurred in the month of
April i 920. The accused had been condemned in
his absence by the Military Court to a very severe
term of imprisonment .
The Commission also quoted a letter dated
August 22nd, 1929, on page 75 of its report inciting
the Arabs in unequivocable terms to take
part in the attacks on the Jews which were to
236 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
begin on the following day. The Commission
observed in this connection (page 76) that this
incitement to attack the Jews had been wrongly
attributed to the Mufti. It had confined itself,
however, to that declaration and had refrained
from stating whether the origin of the letter
quoted had been made the object of serious enquiry.
On the other hand, the Commission noted on
page 77 that the Mufti had not scrupled to bear
false witness. The Commission, however, had
drawn no conclusion from this.
Account should also be taken to two facts
which M. Van Fees thought particularly significant
.
According to a secret letter from the Chief
of Police at Jerusalem dated August 23rd, 1929,
a facsimile of which had been forwarded to the
Permanent Mandates Commission, a black list
had been drawn up as a result of a conference
of police officials held on July 2nd, that was to
say, a little before the outbreak of the disturbance.
The first name on that list was that of
Haj Amin El Husseini, the Grand Mufti.
In the British Parliament, the attention of the
Government had been drawn to the fact that
the Mufti had, on April 17th, 1930 sent a letter
to his colleague Sheikh Mustapha Ghalaini, PresiAPPENDIX
VI
237
dent of the Moslem Council at Beirut, urging
him to incite the Arabs in Syria to rebel against
the French authorities .
M. Van Rees considered that these facts, taken
in conjunction with his previous statements,
were not without importance for anyone whq
wished to arrive at the unvarnished truth .
APPENDIX VII
THE PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER
PALESTINE
Statement o f Policy by His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom

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