APPENDIX VI
THE HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE
Statement made by M. Van Rees,
Vice-Chairman
of the Permanent Mandates Commission,
in
Geneva, June 5, 1930
M. VAN REES thought it useless to draw
conclusions
from this, since they were obvious .
M. Van Rees, continuing, wished to
examine
the complaints of the Jews . No
chapter of the
Commission of Enquiry's report was
devoted to
the legal side of the position of the
Jews in Palestine.
Only a passing reference was made to
that
situation, and there was no effort to
explain the
grounds on which the Jews inhabited
Palestine
nor up to what point their demands
must be regarded
as legitimate.
Since any serious examination of the
rights of
the Jews to live and carry on their
activity in
Palestine was not to be found in the
report, it
was difficult not to draw the
conclusion that this
point of capital importance had not
received in
the report the attention which it
deserved.
:4:
22I
222 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
The Commission did not state that the
Balfour
Declaration was the basis of the
presence
of the Jews in Palestine and of their
activities .
The Commission of Enquiry did not
explain its
views on the close connection between
that Declaration
and certain provisions in the
Palestine
mandate. It had confined itself to
quoting them,
but had refrained from giving any
interpretation.
It had ended by recommending the
British
Government to explain more explicitly
than had
been the case in 1922 its policy with
regard to
the Jews . The most striking fact was
that, although
the report referred in many places to
the
official statements contained in the
White Paper
of June, 1922, the Commission seemed
to have
attached no importance to the basis of
those
statements which it did not even quote
. Yet that
basis was that "the Jewish people
will be in Palestine
as of right and not on
sufferance" (see White
Paper, page 30) .
Nevertheless, it was this statement of Mr .
Churchill's which, by explaining the
legal reasons
for the establishment of the Jews in
the
country, furnished the key to that
which was
not clear in the report of the
Commission.
The Balfour Declaration of November
2nd,
1917, as recorded in the
Preamble and developed
APPENDIX VI
223
in Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and i i of the
Palestine Mandate,
had a very definite meaning .
It was not, as several persons had
seen fit to
interpret it, a mere gracious gesture,
a mere public
manifestation of indulgent pity toward
the
Jewish people. It would be altogether
too naive
to believe that this had been the only
feeling inspiring
Great Britain in her Declaration of
November
2rid, 11917. It would be also
equally naive
to believe that that declaration had
been approved
by all the Great Powers merely in
order
to please Great Britain or in order to
show their
sympathy for the Jews .
Interpreted in its own words and with
the aid
of the text of the mandate based upon
it, the
Balfour Declaration would be seen to
be an act
based on purely political
considerations and designed
to secure an eminently practical
object .
That object had certainly not been the
oppression
of a people established in the country
by
another people, as the adversaries of
the Declaration
wished it to be believed, despite the
reservations
contained in the Declaration . On the
contrary, its object was the
resurrection of the
people established in Palestine . Its
object was to
arouse them from their centuries-old
lethargy
and to secure the social and economic
development
of the country, not by the efforts of
the
224 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
Administration alone, but by the
active co-operation
of a more energetic and more highly
developed
people . In short, the real object of
the
Balfour Declaration had been the
establishment,
by the co-activity of the Government
and of
the Jewish people, of a social and economic
order
corresponding to the principles and
requirements
of European civilisation, while at the
same time
respecting the rights and interests of
the existing
inhabitants .
It had been that reason, which,
disregarding
the other considerations relating to
the primary
interests of the Empire, had induced
the Government
to agree, in order to fulfil the
mission
which it had felt sure would be given
to it at
the end of the war, to allow the
Jewish people
to participate, not in the powers of
administration
of Palestine, but in the practical
execution
of that mission.
This conception appeared to be fully
justified
by the facts. It explained the reason
why Mr .
Churchill, as M. Van Rees had already
pointed
out, had been able to state that the
Jewish people
would be in Palestine "as of
right" ; or in other
words, that that people would not
enter the
country as foreigners, but would
belong to the
Palestinian nation to be subsequently
created . It
would further explain why Article 4 of
the ManAPPENDIX
VI
225
date officially recognised the Jewish
organisation
as the organisation representing the
Jewish people
and chosen to co-operate with the
Government.
It further explained why Articles 6
and
7 referred to the special privileges enjoyed by
Jews in respect of immigration, the
acquisition
of Palestinian nationality and their
establishment
on empty land, subject to reservations
regarding
the rights and interests of other
persons . Finally,
it explained why Article i i, of which
the meaning
was just as significant, expressly
enjoined the
participation of the Jews in the
execution or exploitation
of public works and services as well
as
in the development of the natural
resources of
the country.
All these provisions were closely
interconnected.
They formed a single whole and clearly
expressed the fundamental idea that to
the work
of civilisation to be carried out in
Palestine the
Jewish element would contribute its
moral and
above all its material support, not in
virtue of
holding any kind of concession of an
economic
nature, but in virtue of its right to
collaborate
with the Administration . In this the
Jewish activity
formed an integral part of the
economic
evolution of Palestine, of which the
mandate
had been entrusted to the Mandatory
Power and
226 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
'which was the primary condition of
the political
development of the country.
M. Van Rees thought it regrettable
that this
point had not been seriously
considered by the
Commission of Enquiry. It was even
more regrettable
that the special situation granted by
the
mandate to the Jewish element in
Palestine appeared
to have escaped the notice of the
Administration
itself to such a degree that the three
statesmen whose names were specially
connected
with the Declaration of November 2nd, 1917-
Lord Balf our, Mr. Lloyd George and
Mr. Smuts
-had been led to state publicly that
causes
"which are still obscure have
impeded the task
of administration and consequently the
full carrying
out of the policy" (letter
published by
The Times, December zoth, 1929) .
It must be recognised that this was
the, main
substance of the Jewish complaints .
All the information
which the Commission possessed
regarding
the manner in which the Mandate had
been applied showed that the three
statesmen
whom he had just quoted had not been
mistaken .
On the contrary, the fact was that,
generally
speaking, the clauses of the Mandate
concerning
the Jews had not, in practice,
received that application
which their authors might have
expected
; not, in the first place, owing to
the volAPPENDIX
VI
227
untary opposition of the
Administration, but in
consequence, M. Van Rees thought, at
any rate
in part, of the misunderstanding of
the special
situation which the international
obligations assumed
by Great Britain had granted to Jewish
people in Palestine.
At this stage, M . Van Rees would
enquire
whether the British Government
substantially
adopted the statement of the Shaw
Commission
to the effect that no premeditation
and no organised
revolt had occurred, for this point was
not clearly stated in the British
Government's
memorandum.
Dr. Drummond Shiels replied in the
affirmative.
The views of the British Government on
this
point were contained in that document
.
M. Van Rees said that in that case he
wished
to explain his views on that part of
the conclusions
of the Commission of Enquiry .
As far as the question of
premeditation was
concerned, the Commission of Enquiry
justified
its conclusions by observing
(paragraph 2 of its
conclusions, page z58) that the disorders
had
not occurred simultaneously in all
parts of Palestine.
'What did this argument mean? Was it
necessary that a rebellion should
simultaneously
spread to all the parts of a territory
before it
could be concluded that it was premeditated?
228 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
The second argument on which the
Commission
based its views did not appear more
conclusive.
The day before the outbreak of the
disorder
(see the report page 8o), the representatives
of Jews and Arabs had met in
conference
to discuss the interests of Palestine
. The exchange
of views had taken place "in a
friendly
spirit." This was a fact to which
the Commission
appeared to attach great importance,
and it was
all the more surprising in that
everyone knew
that Orientals, and among them the
Arabs, in
particular, were some of the best
diplomatists
in the world, and that they were very
careful
not to show their real thoughts by
adopting a
revealing attitude .
He felt it difficult, therefore, to
understand
why the Commission of Enquiry had
concluded
that there had been no premeditation
and no organisation
in preparing for the disturbances,
despite
a number of its observations to which
he
thought it useful to draw attention .
"That the first of these motives
is proved
there can be no question ; neither the
Arab
Executive nor the Mufti has at any
time endeavoured
to conceal the fact that the policy
which, since 1918, successive
Governments of
His Majesty have followed in Palestine
is reAPPENDIX
VI
229
garded by them as being detrimental to
the
interests of those whom they represent
. Their
opposition to that policy has been
unwavering.
The Arab Executive, from its
institution,
has opposed the policy and declined to
accept
the White Paper of 1922 (Cmd. 1700) ; there
is no evidence that it has ever
departed from
the attitude which it then adopted.
The Mufti,
as a private person before his
election to his
present office, gave such expression
to his feeling
in the matter of policy in Palestine
that
he was implicated in the disturbances
of
1920." (Page 71)
"The movement which he in part
created
became, through the force of
circumstances,
a not unimportant factor in the events
which
led to the outbreak of August last,
and to that
extent he, like many others who
directly or
indirectly played upon public feeling
in Palestine,
must accept a share in the
responsibility
for the disturbances." (Page 75)
"That in many districts there was
incitement
and that in some cases those who
incited
were members of the Moslem hierarchy
are
facts which have been established to
the satisfaction
of Courts in Palestine ; equally, it
cannot
be questioned that agitators were
touring
the country in the third week of
August last
230 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
and were summoning the people of
certain
districts to Jerusalem." (Page
75)
"Opposition to the Balfour
Declaration is
an important element in the policy of
the
Palestine Arab Executive and, as we
have already
stated, it is our opinion that their
feelings
on this political issue might have
provided
a sufficient motive to have caused
them to incite
or to organise disturbance ."
(Page 78)
"We also accept the evidence that
there was
a marked increase in Arab activity
after August
5th, and as we have already stated, it
cannot be doubted that, during the third
week
of August, agitators were touring the
country."
(Page 79)
"His (Sulehi Bey al Khadra,
member of the
Arab Executive) general demeanour
before us
was such that we believe that he would
welcome
any opportunity of furthering what he
regards as the just cause of Arab
nationalism
in Palestine ." (Page 8o)
M. Van Rees wondered how the
conclusions
that there had been neither
premeditation nor
organisation could be reconciled with
the reservations
and statements made by the Commission
on pages 15 8, 159 and 164 in paragraphs 6, 11,
12, 1 3 and 45 (c) .
APPENDIX VI
231
In its constant preoccupation only to
accept
legal and formal proofs, the
Commission had
reached a negative conclusion as soon
as these
legal principles appeared to it to be
inconclusive.
It seemed to have ignored the fact
that, in
an Eastern country where feudal
conditions of
life still existed, effective proof
against the traditional
religious and other leaders of the
people
would very rarely be found . The
Commission
appeared not to have realised that, in
those circumstances,
a passive attitude on the part of the
leaders was generally as significant
in the case
of a population worked up by agitation
and excited
by an appeal to their religious
feelings as
active participation in the subsequent
rising .
In his reference to the Commission of
Enquiry,
M. Van Rees had spoken only of the
majority.
The minority consisted of a single
member,
Mr. Snell. In his report, that
gentleman had
adopted a far more logical attitude
than that
adopted by the majority. On page 172 he said
that the causes of the disturbances of
August
"were due to fears and
antipathies which, I am
convinced, the Moslem and Arab leaders
awakened
and fostered for political needs
." With reference
to the Mufti, Mr . Snell said on the
same
page:
232 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
"I have not the least doubt that
he was
aware of the nature of that campaign
and
that he realised the danger of
disturbances
which is never absent when religious
propaganda
of an exciting character is spread
among
a Moslem people. I therefore attribute
to the
Mufti a greater share in the
responsibility for
the disturbance than is attributed to
him in
the report. I am of opinion that the
Mufti
must bear the blame for his failure to
make
any effort to control the character of
an agitation
conducted in the name of a religion of
which, in Palestine, he was the head
."
Mr. Snell went on to state :
"If the campaign of political
agitation had
for its objective the removal of
grievances and
the securing of safeguards for the
future, the
methods of propaganda adopted by the
Arab
leaders were, in my opinion,
ill-chosen and
futile ; if, on the other hand, the
campaign
was designed to arouse Arab and Moslem
passion,
those who participated in it, knowing
full well the results of like
agitation in the
past, cannot have been unaware of the
possibility
that serious disturbance would follow
.
Though I agree, that the Arab
Executive is
not of necessity responsible as a body
for the
APPENDIX VI 233
words or acts of its followers or even
its individual
members, I find it difficult to
believe
that the actions of individual members
of the
Executive were unknown to that body,
or indeed,
that those individuals were acting in
a
purely personal capacity ."
Mr. Snell next pointed out: (page 173)
"Finally, in regard to the
campaign of incitement,
I am unable to agree that the
conclusions
in the report acquitting the Moslem
religious authorities of all but the
slightest
blame for the innovations introduced
in the
neighbourhood of the Wailing Wall . .
. . It
is my view that many innovations which
followed
thereafter, such as the construction
of
the zawiyah, the calling to prayer by
the
muezzin and the opening of the new
doorway,
were dictated less by the needs of the
Moslem religion and the rights of
property
than by the studied desire to provoke
and
wound the religious susceptibilities
of the Jewish
people."
Mr. Snell finally repeated, on page 18o, that
the feeling of hostility and animosity
on the part
of the Arabs towards the Jews
" . . . . was rather the result
of a campaign
234 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
of propaganda and incitement than the
natural
consequence of economic factors
."
After a close study of all the
elements of the
problem to which M. Van Rees had devoted
considerable
time, he had not the least doubt that
the responsibility for what had
happened must
lie with the religious and political
leaders of the
Arabs. This profound conviction had
caused M.
Van Rees to associate himself entirely
with the
remarkably well expressed account of
the matter
that had appeared in an article
written by M .
William Martin, published in the Nouvelle Revue
Juive for the month of April, 1930 (page 22) .
The only result of that proclamation
on the
Arabs had been that they had
maintained that
the Jews were alone responsible for
the sanguinary
disorders, as could be seen from page 68 of
the report of the Commission of
Enquiry. In
making such an inconceivably foolish
statement,
they did not realise that they were
showing exactly
the same mentality as that displayed
in
British India at the present time .
Since Gandhi
had openly declared civil
disobedience, disorders
had occurred which he pretended not to
have
desired but which must inevitably have
occurred .
Nevertheless, it was still true that,
in the eyes
of his partisans and in his own eyes,
the British
APPENDIX VI
2 35
Government must be held responsible
for the
victims of the madness which he had
let loose .
It was true, that in British India
there were no
Jews to whom the responsibility for
what had
happened could be attributed.
It was very difficult to believe that,
in spite of
its own doubts, to which M. Van Rees
had just
referred and despite the delicate
manner in which
those doubts had been expressed, the
Commission
had been able to conclude that there
had
been no premeditation or organisation
of the
disturbances on the part of the Arab
leaders . It
was even more surprising that the
Commission
should have extended this conclusion
to cover
the Head of the Supreme Moslem
Council, the
Grand Mufti Haj Amin El Husseini,
referred
to in several quarters as one of the
principal organisers
of these disturbances.
On page 71 of its report, the Commission
stated that the Mufti had been
implicated in the
troubles which had occurred in the
month of
April i 920. The accused had been condemned in
his absence by the Military Court to a
very severe
term of imprisonment .
The Commission also quoted a letter
dated
August 22nd, 1929, on page 75 of its report
inciting
the Arabs in unequivocable terms to
take
part in the attacks on the Jews which
were to
236 THE GREAT BETRAYAL
begin on the following day. The
Commission
observed in this connection (page 76)
that this
incitement to attack the Jews had been
wrongly
attributed to the Mufti. It had
confined itself,
however, to that declaration and had
refrained
from stating whether the origin of the
letter
quoted had been made the object of
serious enquiry.
On the other hand, the Commission
noted on
page 77 that the Mufti had not
scrupled to bear
false witness. The Commission,
however, had
drawn no conclusion from this.
Account should also be taken to two
facts
which M. Van Fees thought particularly
significant
.
According to a secret letter from the
Chief
of Police at Jerusalem dated August
23rd, 1929,
a facsimile of which had been
forwarded to the
Permanent Mandates Commission, a black
list
had been drawn up as a result of a
conference
of police officials held on July 2nd,
that was to
say, a little before the outbreak of
the disturbance.
The first name on that list was that
of
Haj Amin El Husseini, the Grand Mufti.
In the British Parliament, the
attention of the
Government had been drawn to the fact
that
the Mufti had, on April 17th, 1930
sent a letter
to his colleague Sheikh Mustapha
Ghalaini, PresiAPPENDIX
VI
237
dent of the Moslem Council at Beirut,
urging
him to incite the Arabs in Syria to
rebel against
the French authorities .
M. Van Rees considered that these
facts, taken
in conjunction with his previous
statements,
were not without importance for anyone
whq
wished to arrive at the unvarnished
truth .
APPENDIX VII
THE PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER
PALESTINE
Statement o f Policy by His Majesty's
Government
in the United Kingdom
I
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