THE HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE

APPENDIX VI

THE HOME LAND CLAIM PALESTINE

Statement made by M. Van Rees, Vice-Chairman

of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in

Geneva, June 5, 1930

M. VAN REES thought it useless to draw conclusions

from this, since they were obvious .

M. Van Rees, continuing, wished to examine

the complaints of the Jews . No chapter of the

Commission of Enquiry's report was devoted to

the legal side of the position of the Jews in Palestine.

Only a passing reference was made to that

situation, and there was no effort to explain the

grounds on which the Jews inhabited Palestine

nor up to what point their demands must be regarded

as legitimate.

Since any serious examination of the rights of

the Jews to live and carry on their activity in

Palestine was not to be found in the report, it

was difficult not to draw the conclusion that this

point of capital importance had not received in

the report the attention which it deserved.

:4:

22I

222 THE GREAT BETRAYAL

The Commission did not state that the Balfour

Declaration was the basis of the presence

of the Jews in Palestine and of their activities .

The Commission of Enquiry did not explain its

views on the close connection between that Declaration

and certain provisions in the Palestine

mandate. It had confined itself to quoting them,

but had refrained from giving any interpretation.

It had ended by recommending the British

Government to explain more explicitly than had

been the case in 1922 its policy with regard to

the Jews . The most striking fact was that, although

the report referred in many places to the

official statements contained in the White Paper

of June, 1922, the Commission seemed to have

attached no importance to the basis of those

statements which it did not even quote . Yet that

basis was that "the Jewish people will be in Palestine

as of right and not on sufferance" (see White

Paper, page 30) .

Nevertheless, it was this statement of Mr .

Churchill's which, by explaining the legal reasons

for the establishment of the Jews in the

country, furnished the key to that which was

not clear in the report of the Commission.

The Balfour Declaration of November 2nd,

1917, as recorded in the Preamble and developed

APPENDIX VI

223

in Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and i i of the Palestine Mandate,

had a very definite meaning .

It was not, as several persons had seen fit to

interpret it, a mere gracious gesture, a mere public

manifestation of indulgent pity toward the

Jewish people. It would be altogether too naive

to believe that this had been the only feeling inspiring

Great Britain in her Declaration of November

2rid, 11917. It would be also equally naive

to believe that that declaration had been approved

by all the Great Powers merely in order

to please Great Britain or in order to show their

sympathy for the Jews .

Interpreted in its own words and with the aid

of the text of the mandate based upon it, the

Balfour Declaration would be seen to be an act

based on purely political considerations and designed

to secure an eminently practical object .

That object had certainly not been the oppression

of a people established in the country by

another people, as the adversaries of the Declaration

wished it to be believed, despite the reservations

contained in the Declaration . On the

contrary, its object was the resurrection of the

people established in Palestine . Its object was to

arouse them from their centuries-old lethargy

and to secure the social and economic development

of the country, not by the efforts of the

224 THE GREAT BETRAYAL

Administration alone, but by the active co-operation

of a more energetic and more highly developed

people . In short, the real object of the

Balfour Declaration had been the establishment,

by the co-activity of the Government and of

the Jewish people, of a social and economic order

corresponding to the principles and requirements

of European civilisation, while at the same time

respecting the rights and interests of the existing

inhabitants .

It had been that reason, which, disregarding

the other considerations relating to the primary

interests of the Empire, had induced the Government

to agree, in order to fulfil the mission

which it had felt sure would be given to it at

the end of the war, to allow the Jewish people

to participate, not in the powers of administration

of Palestine, but in the practical execution

of that mission.

This conception appeared to be fully justified

by the facts. It explained the reason why Mr .

Churchill, as M. Van Rees had already pointed

out, had been able to state that the Jewish people

would be in Palestine "as of right" ; or in other

words, that that people would not enter the

country as foreigners, but would belong to the

Palestinian nation to be subsequently created . It

would further explain why Article 4 of the ManAPPENDIX

VI

225

date officially recognised the Jewish organisation

as the organisation representing the Jewish people

and chosen to co-operate with the Government.

It further explained why Articles 6 and

7 referred to the special privileges enjoyed by

Jews in respect of immigration, the acquisition

of Palestinian nationality and their establishment

on empty land, subject to reservations regarding

the rights and interests of other persons . Finally,

it explained why Article i i, of which the meaning

was just as significant, expressly enjoined the

participation of the Jews in the execution or exploitation

of public works and services as well as

in the development of the natural resources of

the country.

All these provisions were closely interconnected.

They formed a single whole and clearly

expressed the fundamental idea that to the work

of civilisation to be carried out in Palestine the

Jewish element would contribute its moral and

above all its material support, not in virtue of

holding any kind of concession of an economic

nature, but in virtue of its right to collaborate

with the Administration . In this the Jewish activity

formed an integral part of the economic

evolution of Palestine, of which the mandate

had been entrusted to the Mandatory Power and

226 THE GREAT BETRAYAL

'which was the primary condition of the political

development of the country.

M. Van Rees thought it regrettable that this

point had not been seriously considered by the

Commission of Enquiry. It was even more regrettable

that the special situation granted by the

mandate to the Jewish element in Palestine appeared

to have escaped the notice of the Administration

itself to such a degree that the three

statesmen whose names were specially connected

with the Declaration of November 2nd, 1917-

Lord Balf our, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Smuts

-had been led to state publicly that causes

"which are still obscure have impeded the task

of administration and consequently the full carrying

out of the policy" (letter published by

The Times, December zoth, 1929) .

It must be recognised that this was the, main

substance of the Jewish complaints . All the information

which the Commission possessed regarding

the manner in which the Mandate had

been applied showed that the three statesmen

whom he had just quoted had not been mistaken .

On the contrary, the fact was that, generally

speaking, the clauses of the Mandate concerning

the Jews had not, in practice, received that application

which their authors might have expected

; not, in the first place, owing to the volAPPENDIX

VI

227

untary opposition of the Administration, but in

consequence, M. Van Rees thought, at any rate

in part, of the misunderstanding of the special

situation which the international obligations assumed

by Great Britain had granted to Jewish

people in Palestine.

At this stage, M . Van Rees would enquire

whether the British Government substantially

adopted the statement of the Shaw Commission

to the effect that no premeditation and no organised

revolt had occurred, for this point was

not clearly stated in the British Government's

memorandum.

Dr. Drummond Shiels replied in the affirmative.

The views of the British Government on this

point were contained in that document .

M. Van Rees said that in that case he wished

to explain his views on that part of the conclusions

of the Commission of Enquiry .

As far as the question of premeditation was

concerned, the Commission of Enquiry justified

its conclusions by observing (paragraph 2 of its

conclusions, page z58) that the disorders had

not occurred simultaneously in all parts of Palestine.

'What did this argument mean? Was it

necessary that a rebellion should simultaneously

spread to all the parts of a territory before it

could be concluded that it was premeditated?

228 THE GREAT BETRAYAL

The second argument on which the Commission

based its views did not appear more conclusive.

The day before the outbreak of the disorder

(see the report page 8o), the representatives

of Jews and Arabs had met in conference

to discuss the interests of Palestine . The exchange

of views had taken place "in a friendly

spirit." This was a fact to which the Commission

appeared to attach great importance, and it was

all the more surprising in that everyone knew

that Orientals, and among them the Arabs, in

particular, were some of the best diplomatists

in the world, and that they were very careful

not to show their real thoughts by adopting a

revealing attitude .

He felt it difficult, therefore, to understand

why the Commission of Enquiry had concluded

that there had been no premeditation and no organisation

in preparing for the disturbances, despite

a number of its observations to which he

thought it useful to draw attention .

"That the first of these motives is proved

there can be no question ; neither the Arab

Executive nor the Mufti has at any time endeavoured

to conceal the fact that the policy

which, since 1918, successive Governments of

His Majesty have followed in Palestine is reAPPENDIX

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229

garded by them as being detrimental to the

interests of those whom they represent . Their

opposition to that policy has been unwavering.

The Arab Executive, from its institution,

has opposed the policy and declined to accept

the White Paper of 1922 (Cmd. 1700) ; there

is no evidence that it has ever departed from

the attitude which it then adopted. The Mufti,

as a private person before his election to his

present office, gave such expression to his feeling

in the matter of policy in Palestine that

he was implicated in the disturbances of

1920." (Page 71)

"The movement which he in part created

became, through the force of circumstances,

a not unimportant factor in the events which

led to the outbreak of August last, and to that

extent he, like many others who directly or

indirectly played upon public feeling in Palestine,

must accept a share in the responsibility

for the disturbances." (Page 75)

"That in many districts there was incitement

and that in some cases those who incited

were members of the Moslem hierarchy are

facts which have been established to the satisfaction

of Courts in Palestine ; equally, it cannot

be questioned that agitators were touring

the country in the third week of August last

230 THE GREAT BETRAYAL

and were summoning the people of certain

districts to Jerusalem." (Page 75)

"Opposition to the Balfour Declaration is

an important element in the policy of the

Palestine Arab Executive and, as we have already

stated, it is our opinion that their feelings

on this political issue might have provided

a sufficient motive to have caused them to incite

or to organise disturbance ." (Page 78)

"We also accept the evidence that there was

a marked increase in Arab activity after August

5th, and as we have already stated, it

cannot be doubted that, during the third week

of August, agitators were touring the country."

(Page 79)

"His (Sulehi Bey al Khadra, member of the

Arab Executive) general demeanour before us

was such that we believe that he would welcome

any opportunity of furthering what he

regards as the just cause of Arab nationalism

in Palestine ." (Page 8o)

M. Van Rees wondered how the conclusions

that there had been neither premeditation nor

organisation could be reconciled with the reservations

and statements made by the Commission

on pages 15 8, 159 and 164 in paragraphs 6, 11,

12, 1 3 and 45 (c) .

APPENDIX VI

231

In its constant preoccupation only to accept

legal and formal proofs, the Commission had

reached a negative conclusion as soon as these

legal principles appeared to it to be inconclusive.

It seemed to have ignored the fact that, in

an Eastern country where feudal conditions of

life still existed, effective proof against the traditional

religious and other leaders of the people

would very rarely be found . The Commission

appeared not to have realised that, in those circumstances,

a passive attitude on the part of the

leaders was generally as significant in the case

of a population worked up by agitation and excited

by an appeal to their religious feelings as

active participation in the subsequent rising .

In his reference to the Commission of Enquiry,

M. Van Rees had spoken only of the majority.

The minority consisted of a single member,

Mr. Snell. In his report, that gentleman had

adopted a far more logical attitude than that

adopted by the majority. On page 172 he said

that the causes of the disturbances of August

"were due to fears and antipathies which, I am

convinced, the Moslem and Arab leaders awakened

and fostered for political needs ." With reference

to the Mufti, Mr . Snell said on the same

page:

232 THE GREAT BETRAYAL

"I have not the least doubt that he was

aware of the nature of that campaign and

that he realised the danger of disturbances

which is never absent when religious propaganda

of an exciting character is spread among

a Moslem people. I therefore attribute to the

Mufti a greater share in the responsibility for

the disturbance than is attributed to him in

the report. I am of opinion that the Mufti

must bear the blame for his failure to make

any effort to control the character of an agitation

conducted in the name of a religion of

which, in Palestine, he was the head ."

Mr. Snell went on to state :

"If the campaign of political agitation had

for its objective the removal of grievances and

the securing of safeguards for the future, the

methods of propaganda adopted by the Arab

leaders were, in my opinion, ill-chosen and

futile ; if, on the other hand, the campaign

was designed to arouse Arab and Moslem passion,

those who participated in it, knowing

full well the results of like agitation in the

past, cannot have been unaware of the possibility

that serious disturbance would follow .

Though I agree, that the Arab Executive is

not of necessity responsible as a body for the

APPENDIX VI 233

words or acts of its followers or even its individual

members, I find it difficult to believe

that the actions of individual members of the

Executive were unknown to that body, or indeed,

that those individuals were acting in a

purely personal capacity ."

Mr. Snell next pointed out: (page 173)

"Finally, in regard to the campaign of incitement,

I am unable to agree that the conclusions

in the report acquitting the Moslem

religious authorities of all but the slightest

blame for the innovations introduced in the

neighbourhood of the Wailing Wall . . . . It

is my view that many innovations which followed

thereafter, such as the construction of

the zawiyah, the calling to prayer by the

muezzin and the opening of the new doorway,

were dictated less by the needs of the

Moslem religion and the rights of property

than by the studied desire to provoke and

wound the religious susceptibilities of the Jewish

people."

Mr. Snell finally repeated, on page 18o, that

the feeling of hostility and animosity on the part

of the Arabs towards the Jews

" . . . . was rather the result of a campaign

234 THE GREAT BETRAYAL

of propaganda and incitement than the natural

consequence of economic factors ."

After a close study of all the elements of the

problem to which M. Van Rees had devoted considerable

time, he had not the least doubt that

the responsibility for what had happened must

lie with the religious and political leaders of the

Arabs. This profound conviction had caused M.

Van Rees to associate himself entirely with the

remarkably well expressed account of the matter

that had appeared in an article written by M .

William Martin, published in the Nouvelle Revue

Juive for the month of April, 1930 (page 22) .

The only result of that proclamation on the

Arabs had been that they had maintained that

the Jews were alone responsible for the sanguinary

disorders, as could be seen from page 68 of

the report of the Commission of Enquiry. In

making such an inconceivably foolish statement,

they did not realise that they were showing exactly

the same mentality as that displayed in

British India at the present time . Since Gandhi

had openly declared civil disobedience, disorders

had occurred which he pretended not to have

desired but which must inevitably have occurred .

Nevertheless, it was still true that, in the eyes

of his partisans and in his own eyes, the British

APPENDIX VI

2 35

Government must be held responsible for the

victims of the madness which he had let loose .

It was true, that in British India there were no

Jews to whom the responsibility for what had

happened could be attributed.

It was very difficult to believe that, in spite of

its own doubts, to which M. Van Rees had just

referred and despite the delicate manner in which

those doubts had been expressed, the Commission

had been able to conclude that there had

been no premeditation or organisation of the

disturbances on the part of the Arab leaders . It

was even more surprising that the Commission

should have extended this conclusion to cover

the Head of the Supreme Moslem Council, the

Grand Mufti Haj Amin El Husseini, referred

to in several quarters as one of the principal organisers

of these disturbances.

On page 71 of its report, the Commission

stated that the Mufti had been implicated in the

troubles which had occurred in the month of

April i 920. The accused had been condemned in

his absence by the Military Court to a very severe

term of imprisonment .

The Commission also quoted a letter dated

August 22nd, 1929, on page 75 of its report inciting

the Arabs in unequivocable terms to take

part in the attacks on the Jews which were to

236 THE GREAT BETRAYAL

begin on the following day. The Commission

observed in this connection (page 76) that this

incitement to attack the Jews had been wrongly

attributed to the Mufti. It had confined itself,

however, to that declaration and had refrained

from stating whether the origin of the letter

quoted had been made the object of serious enquiry.

On the other hand, the Commission noted on

page 77 that the Mufti had not scrupled to bear

false witness. The Commission, however, had

drawn no conclusion from this.

Account should also be taken to two facts

which M. Van Fees thought particularly significant

.

According to a secret letter from the Chief

of Police at Jerusalem dated August 23rd, 1929,

a facsimile of which had been forwarded to the

Permanent Mandates Commission, a black list

had been drawn up as a result of a conference

of police officials held on July 2nd, that was to

say, a little before the outbreak of the disturbance.

The first name on that list was that of

Haj Amin El Husseini, the Grand Mufti.

In the British Parliament, the attention of the

Government had been drawn to the fact that

the Mufti had, on April 17th, 1930 sent a letter

to his colleague Sheikh Mustapha Ghalaini, PresiAPPENDIX

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237

dent of the Moslem Council at Beirut, urging

him to incite the Arabs in Syria to rebel against

the French authorities .

M. Van Rees considered that these facts, taken

in conjunction with his previous statements,

were not without importance for anyone whq

wished to arrive at the unvarnished truth .

APPENDIX VII

THE PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER

PALESTINE

Statement o f Policy by His Majesty's Government

in the United Kingdom

I